#### **Failure Modes and Effects Analysis**

(This material is taken from the FMEA Info Centre, a non-commercial web-based inventory dedicated to the promotion of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis <a href="http://www.fmeainfocentre.com/index.htm">http://www.fmeainfocentre.com/index.htm</a>.)

#### **Summary of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)**

FMEA is a qualitative reasoning approach best suited for reviews of mechanical and electrical hardware systems. The FMEA technique (1) considers how the failure modes of each system component can result in system performance problems and (2) ensures that appropriate safeguards against such problems are in place. FMEA is best used at the design stage, before the product is placed into service, to insure maximum reliability.

#### **Brief summary of characteristics**

- A systematic, highly structured assessment relying on evaluation of component failure modes and team experience to generate a comprehensive review and ensure that appropriate safeguards against system performance problems are in place
- Used as a system-level and component-level risk assessment technique
- Applicable to any well-defined system
- Sometimes performed by an individual working with system experts through interviews and field inspections, but also can be performed by an interdisciplinary team with diverse backgrounds and experience participating in group review meetings of system documentation and field inspections
- A technique that generates qualitative descriptions of potential performance problems (failure modes, causes, effects, and safeguards) as well as lists of recommendations for reducing risks
- A technique that can provide quantitative failure frequency or consequence estimates

#### Most common uses

- Used primarily for reviews of mechanical and electrical systems, such as fire suppression systems and vessel steering and propulsion systems
- Used frequently as the basis for defining and optimizing planned equipment maintenance because the method systematically focuses directly and individually on equipment failure modes
- Effective for collecting the information needed to troubleshoot system problems

#### Three key questions to be answered by the FMEA process:

- What could fail in each component of my product or design?
- To what extent might it fail and what are the potential hazards produced by the failure?
- What steps should be implemented to prevent failures?

### **Design FMEA Analysis**

Item and	Potential	Potential	$\nabla$	S	Potential	О	Detection	D	R	Recommended
Function	Failure	Effects of		Е	Cause(s)	C	Method &	Е	P	Actions
	Mode	Failure		V	of Failure	C	Quality	T	N	
							Controls			
List Part	List the	List the			List those		List these			List them for
Name,	possible	consequences			such as:		measures			each of the
Number	modes of	of failure on			inadequate		available to			failure modes
and	failure	part function			design,		detect			identified as
Function		and on the			improper		failures			being
		next higher			materials,		before they			significant by
		assembly			etc.		reach the			the RPN
							customer			

Delta = Critical characteristic which may effect safety, compliance with Gov. regulations, or require special controls.


SEV = Severity rating (1 to 10)

OCC = Occurrence frequency (1 to 10)

DET = Detection Rating (1 to 10)

RPN = Risk Priority Number (1 to 1000)

Corrosion	Ingress	Delamination
Fracture	Vibrations	Erosion
Material Yield	Whirl	Thermal shock
Electrical Short	Sagging	Thermal relaxation
Open Circuit	Cracking	Bonding failure
Buckling	Stall	Starved for lubrication
Resonance	Creep	Staining
Fatigue	Thermal expansion	Inefficient
Deflections or deformations	Oxidation	Fretting
Seizure	UV deterioration	Thermal fatigue
Burning	Acoustic noise	Sticking
Misalignment	Scratching and hardness	Intermittent system operation
Stripping	Unstable	Egress
Wear	Loose fittings	Surge
Binding	Unbalanced	
Overshooting (Control)	Embrittlement	
Ringing	Loosening	
Loose	Scoring	
Leaking	Radiation damage	



® 1997

#### Guidelines For Auditing FMEA'S per QS 9000

(Source: Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Reference Manual (AIAG): (Feb, 1996)

- 1. Is there evidence that a cross-functional team was used to develop the FMEA?
- Is the FMEA header completely filled out with a tracking number, the component or (sub) system name, design responsible activity, preparer's name, model year and vehicle (if known), the initial FMEA due date, the date the original FMEA was compiled, the latest revision date and names/departments of team member?
- Is the FMEA that is being audited the latest revision level?
- Function Has the component or (sub) system been identified? Has the nomenclature found on the engineering drawing been used? Has the function of the part been identified?
- 5. Potential Failure Mode Is there at least one failure mode listed for every function?

  6. Potential Effects of Failure Are the effects of the failure defined and are they defined.
- 6. Potential Effects of Failure Are the effects of the failure defined and are they defined in terms of what the internal or vehicle level external customer might notice?
- Severity Is the severity (or seriousness) of the potential effect of the failure rated? (See Definitions provided above.)
- Classification Are the significant and critical characteristics identified in this
  column? (blanks are allowed) (See Special Characteristics model on other side)
- Potential Causes/Mechanisms of Failure Is there at least one potential cause of failure listed for every failure mode?
- Occurrence has an occurrence ranking been assigned to each of the potential causes/mechanisms of failure? (See Definitions provided above.)

- 11. Current Design Controls Is there listed a prevention, design validation/verification (DV) or other activities which will maximize design adequacy of the failure mode and or cause mechanism?
- 12. Detection Is there a detection ranking that assesses the ability of the design controls to detect a potential cause/mechanism or the ability of the design controls to detect the subsequent failure mode before the component or (sub) system is released for production. (See Definitions provided above.)
- 13. RPN Has the RPN been calculated by multiplying S x O x D?
- 14. Recommended Actions Have actions been identified for potential significant and critical characteristics and to lower the risk of the higher RPN failure modes? Has "none" been entered in the column if no actions are recommended?
- Responsibility Has an individual, SBU and target completion date been entered in columns where an action has been recommended? (Blanks are OK when no action is recommended)
- Actions Taken Has a brief description of the actual action and effective date been entered after the action has been taken? (Blanks are OK when no action is recommended).
- 17. Resulting severity, occurrence, detection and RPN Have the new severity, occurrence, detection and RPN numbers been entered after an action has been completed and verified?
- 18. Has the design responsible engineer implemented or adequately addressed the recommended action?

#### Severity, Occurrence, and Detection Criteria for Design FMEA

Severity Evaluation Criteria							
Effect	Criteria: Severity of Effect	Rank					
Hazardous - without warning	Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without warning	10					
Hazardous - with warning	Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning	9					
Very High	Vehicle/item inoperable, with loss of primary function.	8					
High	Vehicle/item operable, but at reduced level of performance. Customer dissatisfied.	7					
Moderate	Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/ Convience item(s) inoperable. Customer experiences discomfort.	6					
Low	Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/ Convience item(s) operable at reduced level of performance. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction.	5					
Very Low	Fit & finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by average customers.	4					
Minor	Fit & finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers.	3					
Very Minor	Fit & finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers.	2					
None	No effect.	1*					

\*Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, Occurrence or Detection are not allowed

	Suggested Occurrence Evaluation Criteria									
Rank	СРК	Failure Rates	Probability of Failure							
10	≥ 0.33	> 1 in 2	Very High: Failure almost inevitable							
9	≥ 0.33	1 in 3	very riigit. Failule aiii lost illevitable							
8	≥ 0.51	1 in 8	High: Repeated failures							
7	≥ 0.67	1 in 20	riigii. Nepealeu lallules							
6	≥ 0.83	1 in 80								
5	<u>≥</u> 1.00	1 in 400	Moderate: Occasional failures							
4	≥ 1.17	1 in 2000								
3	≥ 1.33	1 in 15 000	Low: Relatively few failures							
2	<u>≥</u> 1.50	1 in 150 000	LOW. Inclausely lew latitudes							
1*	<u>≥</u> 1.67	≤ 1 in 1 500 000	Remote: Failure is unlikely							

\*Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, Occurrence or Detection are not allowed

Suggested Detection Eval. Criteria								
Detection	Criteria	Rank						
Absolute Uncertainty	Design Control will not and/or cannot detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control.	10						
Very Remote	Very Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.	9						
Remote	Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode.	8						
Very Low	Very Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode.	7						
Low	Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.	6						
Moderate	Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.	5						
Moderately High	Moderately High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.	4						
High	High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.	3						
Very High	Very High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.	2						
Almost Certain	Design Controls will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.	1*						
*Note: Zero (0) ranking	'Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, Occurrence or Detection are not allowed							

## **Simplified FMEA Example**

A simple column-by-column example using a rifle bolt.

#### **Item and Function**

#### Rifle Bolt

Chambers bullet Locks into receiver Fires a round

Sustains firing pressure on lugs Provides extraction of spent case

#### **Potential Failure Modes**

Fracture Jamming

# Potential Effects of Failure Catastrophic failure with destruction of weapon and injury to personnel-----> yes 10 Failure of weapon to function------> no 1

#### Likelihood of Occurrence (OCC) - Estimate the potential occurrence of failure

#### **Detection Method & Quality Controls**

Incoming Part Inspection
Dye penetrate testing
Measure patterns
Confirm finished casting dimensions

#### Calculate the RPN number $RPN = (SEV) \times (OCC) \times (DET)$

A 1000 rating implies a certain failure that is hazardous and harmful A 1 rating is a failure that is highly unlikely and unimportant Ratings above 100 will occur Rating below 30 are reasonable for typical applications

# Final Column - Based on your RPN number, develop recommended actions to solve failure modes

Assign responsibilities
Outline corrective actions

Revise test plans, material specifications

These actions should be specific, not general action items

Part and Function	Potential Failure Mode	Potential Effects of Failure	D E L T	S E V	Potential Cause(s) of Failure	O C C	Detection Meth & Quality Controls	D E T	R P N	Recommended Actions
Rifle Bolt  \$Chambers bulle \$Locks into receiver \$Fires Round	Fracture	Catastrophic failure with destruction of weapon and injury to	yes	10	Shrinkage SPorosity cause by improper fee		SIncoming Par Inspection SDye penetrate testing		3 0 0	Initiate radiographi testing of all rifle bolts
SSustains firing pressure on lugs SProvides extraction of sper case	Jamming	Failure of weapon to function		8	SOut of spec. Dimension SChange in she refractory	5	\$Measure patterns \$Confirm finished casting dimensions	3	1 2 0	Initiate SPC progra to check and maint bolt dimensions