# PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)

Failure Mode Effects Analyses (FMEAs) evaluate the ways equipment can fail or be improperly operated and the effects these failures can have. In an FMEA, each individual failure is considered as an independent occurrence with no relation to other failures in the system, except for the subsequent effects the original failure may produce. In short, FMEAs identify single failure modes that either directly result in or contribute significantly to an accident.

#### Purpose:

FMEAs are conducted to improve the safety of equipment by:

- 1) Identifying single component, equipment and system failure modes.
- 2) Determining the potential effects on the equipment, system, or plant associated with each individual failure mode.
- 3) Generating recommendations for increasing reliability of the component, equipment and/or system.

### **Deliverables:**

- 1) Qualitative, systematic reference list of equipment, failure modes and effects.
- 2) Worst case estimate of consequences resulting from a single failure.
- 3) Documented analysis.
- 4) Recommendations for improving safety/reliability of appropriate components.

#### Terms:

- 1) Failure Mode describes how equipment fails (open, closed, on, off, leaks, etc.)
- 2) Effect is determined by the system's response to equipment failure.

#### **Procedure:**

#### 1) Defining the Scope:

- Identify specific items for inclusion
- Determine the level of detail needed
- Identify the boundary conditions under which these items are analyzed
  - Identify equipment or system to be analyzed
  - Establish the physical system boundaries (i.e., connections with other processes, utilities, and/or support systems)
  - ♦ Establish the system's analytical boundaries: Initial operating condition of equipment, failure modes, operating consequences, causes, or existing safeguards which will or will not be analyzed
    - (I.e., may exclude jet liner crashes or earthquakes as a failure mode. The initial operating condition may be a normally 'open' or 'closed valve.)


#### 2) Performing the Review:

- Prepare for the review:
  - Select team
  - ♦ Identify facilitator and record keeper
  - Gather schematics and other information
- Use a deliberate, systematic manner to reduce the possibility of omissions and to enhance the completeness (I.e., consistent format for recording information and results which contribute to consistency and detail needed)
- Evaluate all identified failure modes for each component or system addressed in the FMEA before moving on to the next component.
- ♦ Typically, the FEMA format includes:
  - A unique equipment identifier that relates the equipment and components to a system drawing, process, or location. (I.e., component identification numbers from schematics)

- ◆ Equipment description including the equipment type, operating configuration, and other service characteristics that may influence the failure modes and their effects. (I.e., motor-operated valve, normally open, in a three-inch sulfuric acid line.)
- ◆ Failure modes are listed for each component, which are consistent with the equipment description. Consider all conceivable malfunctions that would alter the equipment's normal operating state.
- For each failure mode, describe both the immediate effects of a failure at the location and the anticipated effects of the failure on other components, equipment, and processes.
- For each identified failure mode, the analyst should describe any safety features or procedures that can reduce the likelihood of a specific failure occurring or mitigate the consequences of a failure.
- Recommended corrective actions for reducing the likelihood of effects associated with the specific failure mode are included in the FMEA.

#### 3) Document the results:

- Systematically and consistently tabulate the effects of equipment failure within a process or system.
- Equipment identification provides a direct reference between the equipment and system process flow diagrams and schematics.



## **Example of FMEA Table Format:**

Item No.	Description	Failure Mode	Effect	Safeguards	Actions
Unique Number for component or equipment	Description/ name of component or equipment	How fails (i.e., fails open or fails closed)	Consequences Local System	Prevention/mi tigation measures in place	Actions needed to eliminate, reduce, or mitigate risk of failure

# **Example FMEA**

**System: Firewater Supply** 

Item No.	Component Description	Failure Mode	Effects	Safeguards	Actions
1	Pump suction piping and	Plugged	No water supply to	Redundant pump	
	screen		firewater pump	Periodic testing	
		Broken	Debris sucked into pump	Redundant pump Periodic testing	Inspect pump suction strainer periodically
2	Firewater pump/driver	External rupture	Loss of firewater supply	Redundant pump	
		Fails to start	Loss of firewater supply	Redundant pump Periodic testing	
		Fails off while running	Loss of firewater supply	Redundant pump Periodic testing	
		Operates with degraded head/flow performance	Loss of firewater supply	Redundant pump Periodic testing	
3	Pump discharge pipe from check valve	External rupture	Loss of firewater supply	Redundant pump Check valve in discharge line	
		Plugged	Loss of firewater supply	Redundant pump Periodic testing	
4	Air release valve (ARV-610/611)	Plugged or fails to operate	Air trapped in system, possible hydraulic hammer	Periodic testing	
	,	Stuck open	Firewater leak	Periodic testing	
5	PCV-610B/611B	Plugged or fails to open	Damaged firewater pump	Redundant pump	Add PCV-610B/611B to periodic test schedule
		Opens prematurely or fails to close	Diversion of firewater overboard		Add PCV-610B/611B to periodic test schedule Verify manual close mechanism on PCV- 610B/611B
6	Check valve	Stuck open	Potential diversion of firewater backward through idle pump Prevents starting of idle diesel or damages pump during start up		Test discharge check valve during periodic firewater pump tests
7	Pipe from pump check valve to firewater header	External rupture	Loss of firewater supply	Redundant pump Manual isolation valves	
		Plugged	Loss of firewater supply	Redundant pump Alternate water path	
8	Discharge strainer	Plugged	Loss of firewater supply	Redundant pump Periodic testing	Verify strainer material is resistant to marine growth
		Broken	Debris plugs firewater nozzles	Clean out settings on fire monitors and hoses	Inspect screen condition periodically

Item No.	Component Description	Failure Mode	Effects	Safeguards	Actions
9	Manual test valve	Prematurely opens Left open after test	Diversion of firewater overboard	Redundant valve in discharge line Low pressure switch (PSL-610B/611B)	Requires indepent check of valve position after tresting & periodically thereafter Indicate pressure switch status in control room
		Prematurely closes Left closed during test	Blocked discharge from firewater pump, possibly damaging pump	Pressure control valve (PCV-610B/611B)	
10	Isolation valve for firewater loop	Prematurely closes Left closed after test	Loss of firewater supply		Requires independent check of valve position after testing and peridically thereafter
11	PSL-610B/611B	Spurious low signal	Starts firewater pump		
		Failure to signal	Firewater pump fails to start on pressure demand	Remote starting system Manual starting system Redundant pump & starting system	Add pressure switch testing to routine pump test

**FMEA Electrical Example** 

Item No.	Component Description	Failure Mode	Effects	Safeguards	Actions
1	Breaker (AB-1)	Inadvertently opens	Shutdown of A-100 Shutdown of FCCU	AB-10 opens on low voltage	◆ Implement an automatic switchover to AB-8 without tripping AB-10     ◆ Increase/improve preventive maintenance     ◆ Include IR scanning in quarterly PMs     ◆ Provide a mechanism to verify AB-4 loading while the FCCU is operating
		Operator cycles breaker	Potential damage to A-100, A-200, A-300, PR-1, PR-2, PR-3, P- 100A/B or P-200A/B Potential shutdown of FCCU	<ul> <li>Labels on breakers</li> <li>CB-7 is normally open</li> <li>All breakers open on faults</li> <li>Internal surge protection for A-100</li> </ul>	Implement out-of-phase permissives that prevent closing beakers between voltage sources     Initiate additional operator training
		Fails to Open	Potential damage to A-100 Potential shutdown of FCCU	<ul> <li>Main bus breakers open on faults</li> <li>AB-6 opens on faults</li> <li>AB-10 opens on faults, high and low voltage, or high current (time delay)</li> <li>Internal surge protection for A-100</li> </ul>	
		Loss of DC power supply	Loss of breaker control (breakers remain in current positions)	<ul> <li>◆ DC undervoltage alarm</li> <li>◆ DC ground indicators</li> </ul>	Verify that all DC equipment is inside only